INTRODUCTION
A patent confers on the patentee the right to exclude others from the use of the knowledge that the patent covers. Patents, however, are not the only feasible way to reach exclusiveness and other economic means might be used as well. Indeed, the alternatives are often thought to be more effective at enabling the inventor to benefit from the innovation than patenting itself (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 1996) . The instrument of exclusion is, however, not a matter of indifference for society. The way in which patents are used (or not used) affects the evolution of the industrial structure and the technology itself. Specifically, unlike such alternatives as lead time, first mover advantage and secrecy, patents can be used to sell technology, typically through license contracts. Simply put, patents can play a key role in facilitating the purchase and sale of technology.
This essay moves beyond the traditional approach to patents that has mainly focused on patents as means to exclude others and highlights the role of the market for technology. A market for technology not only helps diffuse existing technology more efficiently, it also enables firms to specialize in the generation of new technology. In turn, such specialization is likely to hasten the pace of technological change itself. However, the development of a market for technology is not an automatic outcome, and depends upon a number of factors that include the strength of patent rights, as well as the nature of the technology and the industry structure itself.
The chemical industry provides a natural framework within which to explore these themes. It is a technology-based industry with a long history of patenting. Further, as we show in this essay, transactions in technology have become widespread, and have increased in frequency and importance over the last couple of decades. In developing our argument we will both draw upon the rich historical context offered by the industry and on our analysis of a large data set on investment and licensing in chemical plants during the 1980s.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical underpinnings upon which we draw in the discussion of the historical facts. In section 3 we show how, in the past, chemical firms have used patents as one of the ways of excluding competitors and creating monopolies. But as section 4 argues, patents have also facilitated the entry of new firms and a progressive division of labor. These changes are reflected in the widespread licensing of chemical process technologies. Furthermore, these changes have profoundly influenced how even large chemical producers appropriate rents from their innovations. Section 5 presents evidence on the patterns of transactions in the market for technology during the 1980s. Section 6 discusses the specific features of the chemical industry that have favored the creation of a market for technology. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the discussion.
PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND DIFFUSION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Much of the early economics literature on patents focused upon the trade-off between the social inefficiency due to monopoly and the social benefits from the innovation. The major policy question related to the optimum length (and later, length and breadth) of the temporary monopoly to be granted (see for instance Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990, and Klemperer, 1990 ).
Implicitly, a one-to-one relationship was assumed between a patent and an innovation.
Although analytically convenient, this assumption obscured the point that in technologies that are cumulative or systemic, an innovation may require many different pieces of knowledge, some of which may be patented and owned by people with conflicting interests. As Paul David (1993) has noted, knowledge is different from the prototypical public goods such as lighthouses and airport beacons. One important point of differentiation is that the acquisition of knowledge is cumulative and inter-active: knowledge itself is an important input into the production of knowledge.
With cumulative and systemic technologies, an agent holding a patent on an important component may cause severe "holdup" problems, retarding the development of the technology.
(See also Scotchmer, 1991, and Green and Scotchmer, 1993 , for further discussion.) In a similar vein, Merges and Nelson (1990, 1993) argue that broad patents increase the likelihood that an innovator would try to control future innovations based upon its own innovation, thereby slowing down the pace of technological progress.
1 The Merges and Nelson argument is based on the assumption that technological development tends to proceed more vigorously and creatively under a regime where there are many rival sources of invention, than in a setting where one or a few organizations control developments.
However, the essential problem is not caused by patents, but by factors (such as negotiation costs) that prevent agents from entering into contracts for the use of patents. Thus the issue at stake is the impact that better defined patent rights would have on transaction costs.
In a more recent paper, Merges (1998) uses the incomplete contracting approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) to argue that well defined patents reduce transaction costs, and thereby help increase transactions in technology. As the examples of technology 1 In a recent paper, Matutes et al. (1996) study how the patent protection regime might affect the pattern of development of subsequent innovations based on significant breakthroughs. They argue that, in the absence of patent protection, an innovator who has made a significant breakthrough would be tempted to get a head start in developing the applications of the new discovery before commercializing any product. Such delay is socially undesirable. They show that the scope of the patent (breadth) is the dimension that should be used to induce early disclosure of fundamental innovations while still preserving firms' incentive to do R&D.
sharing agreements in the chemical industry, discussed below, show, patents play an important role in structuring complex contracts involving the exchange of technology between large firms.
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Efficient contracting for technology is particularly important because innovations may systematically originate in firms that will not develop and utilize the knowledge themselves.
Rather, a division of labor in innovative activity can exist, whereby innovations are transferred to other firms that develop and commercialize them further (Arora and Gambardella, 1994) .
Patents can play an important role in determining the efficiency of knowledge flows, which are critical to any knowledge-based division of labor. This aspect of the role of patents has not been given adequate attention in the literature, which has mainly focused on patents as means of exclusion.
This neglect of the possibility of sale of technology is rooted partly in the well-known fact that licensing contracts in the past have tended to be imperfect. As a result, innovators have been unable to appropriate a substantial share of the rents from the innovation. Arrow (1962: 355) notes that:
"Patent royalties are generally so low that the profits from exploiting one's own invention are not appreciably greater than those derived from the use of others' knowledge. It really calls for some explanation why the firm that has developed the knowledge cannot demand a greater share of the resulting profits."
Bounded rationality is undoubtedly an important part of the reason why licensing is sometimes not an efficient way to appropriate rents from innovation. Another reason may have to do with the tacit component of technology. Economic models of innovation have implicitly assumed that all useful technological knowledge, once produced is costlessly transmittable. In the vast majority of cases, this is simply untrue. In practice, much of the useful knowledge is not codified in the form of patents and blueprints. 3 Often, the innovator has some discretion in how she codifies, stores, and organizes this information. Strong patent protection provides incentives to codify new knowledge in ways that are meaningful and useful to others.
Moreover, to the extent that the tacitness of know-how raises problems for the efficiency of contracts for knowledge, patent protection also directly affects the efficiency of the contracting process itself (Arora, 1995) .
PATENTS AND OTHER RENT APPROPRIATION MECHANISMS IN THE DYESTUFFS SECTOR 4
The way in which patents have been used in the chemical industry has evolved over time. Patents played an important role in the development of organic dyestuffs, the first major product area of the modern organic chemical industry, in the mid 19 th century. Marsh (1994) has argued that serious research in German chemical firms started with the passage of the German Patent Law in 1877, because the new law prevented companies from simply copying new chemical processes, as they had done earlier. 5 However, cause and effect are difficult to separate because this was also the period when significant advances in the scientific understanding of synthetic dyes were recorded. As some scholars have argued, patent law may itself respond to changing social needs (e.g. Merges, 1998) . Thus it may well be that German companies and the German patent law were both responding to the possibilities for commercial 3 Over two thirds of the British firms interviewed by Taylor and Silberston (1973) said that know-how transfer was the main (or one of the main motives) behind their patent licensing agreements. 4 This section draws heavily on Arora (1997) .
application opened up by scientific advances. German companies were quick to grasp the potential that the patent system provided for systematically excluding competitors, both at home and abroad.
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Interestingly enough, they used patents in conjunction with other methods. For instance, Hounshell and Smith (1988: 89-90 ) describe how German companies skillfully combined patents and secrecy to keep potential imitators at bay in dyestuffs. The dyestuffs would be composed of a number of different compounds, the precise composition kept secret, but the individual compounds protected by patents. In other instances, dyes patents described the results of a certain process. To minimize the information disclosed, German firms also issued misleading "evasion" patents. In other cases, entire groups of compounds would be patented, with only a fraction having properties similar to the dye of interest, so that a rival would have to undertake elaborate and costly experimentation to discover the actual composition of the dyestuff placed on the market. The net effect was that competitors found it very difficult establish a clear relationship between dyestuff patents and the dyestuffs sold on the markets. These so called "unclassified" dyes commanded significant price premia, often selling for 40-50% over the standard colors whose composition was known.
This combination of secrecy and patent protection was probably a response to two factors. First, early German law provided for process patents but not for product patents.
Second, some aspects of the process were difficult to codify and protect as patents. Thus, 6 Liebenau (1992: 65) states that "In outline, the strategy involved patenting as many potentially interesting products of industrial R&D as possible. ... Patents were taken out to build walls around whole research areas. ... This strategy was certainly recognized by the three leading German firms by the end of the 19th century. From that time, the big three, Bayer, BASF, and Hoechst owned between them 66% of all German held US chemical patents." This strategy was continued by IG Farben. In 1936, IG Farben held 4,000 patents in the US, and was receiving new ones at the rate of about 300 per year (Smith, 1992: 147 
THE EARLY BEGINNING OF A MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY: PATENTS FOR STRUCTURING

TECHNOLOGY-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
The history of the chemical industry also shows how patents can be used to structure technology sharing cartels. The pre-WWII international chemical market has been characterized by many as a sort of a "gentlemen's club" (e.g. Spitz, 1988; Smith, 1992) . These cartels used a number of instruments, including patent licensing agreements, to maintain market shares and deter entry. 8 The consensus appears to be that cartels such as the dynamite cartel and the alkali cartel did succeed in keeping price above competitive levels by restricting entry, rationing capacity and moderating technological change (see Reader, 1970: 486-9) .
Some cartels were organized around a common technology, and were often initiated by the patent holder. The patent would be licensed, often in return for an equity stake, with technology flow-back agreements. For instance, the Solvay process licensees were required to 7 Another well-known example concerns the Haber-Bosch process. The Japanese government during WWI confiscated the patents for this process. Patents alone proved insufficient for the commercial application of the technology. After the war, some leading Japanese firms tried to approach BASF for purchasing know-how, but without success (Kudo, 1993) . 8 Specifically, even if collusion in the product market is prohibited, firms might design a cross licensing agreement which sets royalties in a way such that the resultant non-cooperative oligopolistic game yields share all improvements with the Solvay company, and the latter would share it with other licensees. To the extent that there were benefits to all licensees from having the Solvay process become the standard process for the production of alkali, such technology sharing cartels were mutually beneficial. In other cases, particularly during the 1920s and 1930s, there were some prominent technology and market sharing agreements, with the agreement Standard and IG
Farben that involved technology sharing in butyl rubber, TEL and arc acetylene (from Standard), and Buna S (from IG Farben) being one of the best known examples.
Though anti-competitive in intent, these arrangements did economize on scarce assets.
For instance, although ICI obtained the basic patent on polyester, Du Pont had developed significant expertise in the production process based on its experience in nylon, and controlled the melt-spinning process that was crucial for successful commercialization. ICI and Du Pont had a long standing agreement that involved technology licensing as well as the extensive sharing of information and know-how. As a result, the two companies quickly settled on a suitable cross-licensing agreement.
One may be tempted to conclude that the effect of an ex-ante research agreement would be to reduce the incentives of the participating firms to do research. The historical evidence suggests a more nuance picture. For instance, the agreement between ICI and Du Pont was not a mere patent pooling agreement but also had provisions for compensation for the technology that was transferred. This implied that even when one company had control over the basic patents, both companies would have incentives to carry out further research in improving and developing complementary innovations. This implication is borne out by the equilibrium profits identical to the cooperative outcome (see for instance Fershtman and Kamien, 1992) .
available historical evidence, which suggests that both firms invested heavily in research in order to better their bargaining positions. early in this century, the oil firms used specialized sub-contractors in various capacities: to procure or manufacture equipment such as pumps and compressors, valves, and heat exchangers, and to provide specialized sub-systems such as piping and the electrical systems.
As these specialized engineering-construction firms (henceforth SEFs) grew in their ability to handle more sophisticated tasks, process design became a part of their activities as well. By the 1960s, SEFs dominated the design and construction of new plants and were important sources of process innovation (Freeman, 1968: 30; Mansfield et al., 1977) .
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The importance of the SEFs lies not only in the fact that they were sources of innovations but also in how they appropriated the rents from innovation. Lacking the downstream assets required to commercialize their innovations themselves, SEFs used licensing as the principal way of profiting from their innovations. Freeman (1968) showed that for the period 1960-66, SEFs as a group accounted for about 30% of all licenses. During the 1980s the importance of SEFs as a source of technology for chemical producers has increased somewhat. Figure 1 shows that in the last decade SEFs supplied the technology for more the one third of plant investments in the world as a whole. 12 Notice that almost 80% of refining. 11 SEFs have been particularly important in two areas: catalytic processes, and engineering design improvements. UOP has a number of innovative catalytic refining, and reforming processes which it has licensed widely. Scientific Design pioneered a number of new pathways to produce basic inputs for synthetic fibers and plastics, such as the air oxidation process for para-xylene (used for polyester). Other SEFs, such as Kellog (high-pressure processes for ammonia) and Badger (fluidized bed catalytic processes) have made significant contributions to engineering design. See also last column of to which we shall return.
SEFs and Market Structure
The creation of an upstream sector specialized in the production of the technology had profound implications for the industrial structure. The availability of process technologies and engineering know-how greatly enhanced the entry into the industry. Spitz (1988: 313) notes 13 Our data set contains information about the licensor in only 44% of the cases. We have mainly focused our analysis on the available information. If missing information on licensors is assumed to indicate use of in-house technology, SEFs as a group would account for about 15% of all plants, but still for about 45% of all technologies purchased from unaffiliated firms. 14 Here and in the following tables, we use "First World" to refer to USA, Canada, Japan and all Western European countries. All the remaining countries are included in the "Third World" group.
that in most major products, the number of producers was between five and fifteen. By contrast, in the pre-WWII era, it was unusual to have more than three producers.
There also exists more indirect support for the idea that the SEFs were major suppliers of technology and know-how to new entrants. In a study of 39 commodity chemicals in the US in a period from the mid '50s to the mid '70s, Lieberman (1989) found that controlling for demand conditions, experience accumulated by incumbents did not act to deter new entry.
Given the importance of learning by doing, this suggests that entrants had access to other sources of know-how, most likely from SEFs. This interpretation is further supported by
Lieberman's findings that entry into concentrated markets, which were also characterized by low rates of patenting by non-producers (both foreign firms and SEFs), usually required that the entrant had developed its own technology. By contrast, less concentrated markets were associated with high rates of patenting by non-producers and high rates of licensing to entrants.
In a related study (of a subset of 24 chemicals) Lieberman (1987) found that high rates of patenting by non-producers were also associated with faster rates of decline in prices. A Smithian perspective suggests that SEFs should be more active in larger markets (e.g., Stigler, 1951) . Figure 2 supports this notion. It shows that SEFs accounted for a larger share of total licensing in larger product markets. Furthermore, although not evident from the figure, larger markets also tend to have a larger fraction of the total investment from small firms. 15 In other words, the evidence is consistent with the notion that SEFs encourage investment, particularly by small firms, and in turn, small firms encourage SEF activity. Table 3 provides further evidence consistent with this idea. 16 Landau (1966: 4) (Chemical Week, 1996) . By comparison, Union Carbide is reported to have earned $300 million from its polyolefin licensing in 1992 (Grindley and Nickerson, 1996) . 18 Proctor and Gamble has been omitted because of very few plants listed in the data set.
Licensing by SEFs
Increasingly, technology is being licensed even in the early stages of development.
The most vivid example is provided by the case of metallocene catalysts, regarded as probably the most significant process innovations in recent years since they provide better properties such as impact strength and toughness, melt characteristics and clarity in films.
The total investment in metallocene research has been estimated at close to $4 billion (Thayer, 1995 developing ways of using metallocene catalysts in existing slurry processes, many of which will be licensed (Chemical Week, 1997b).
Why Is There So Much Licensing By Chemical Producers?
This behavior of the chemical firms runs contrary to the orthodox management prescriptions (e.g. Teece, 1988) . Indeed, the question of whether or not licensing is sensible has been a matter of considerable debate in the industry. 20 Traditional wisdom holds that innovations are best exploited by commercializing them oneself. In this view, licensing is undesirable because the innovator has to share the rents with the licensee, and especially because licensing also implies increased competition and rent dissipation.
How does one explain the widespread use of licensing by major producers? Strategies of rent appropriation depend upon the existing market structure. Specifically, the presence of competing technologies drastically changes the payoff to the strategy of trying to keep one's technology in-house. For instance, suppose there are two viable processes for the production of a particular product, each owned by a different firm. If one of the firms is going to license out (sell) her technology, the best response of the other innovator may well be to license out (sell) as well. The reason is that the rent dissipation will be shared by both the licensor as well as the non-licensor.
In other words, licensing imposes a negative pecuniary externality upon other incumbents, which is not taken into account by the licensor. As a result, licensing can be privately profitable. In turn, it also implies that if there are two or more incumbent firms that have proprietary technologies that are substitutes for each other, both firms would find it privately profitable to license, although their joint profits may well be higher in the absence of any licensing. In other words, unless restrained by mutual agreements, firms would compete not only to supply products but also to supply their technologies. 21 Oligopoly theory suggests that collusive agreements are hard to enforce when the number of potential licensors and the number of incumbents is large. Licensing has been most prevalent in petrochemicals, where the number of producers was relatively large. Soon after WWII, a number of firms, including firms from Asia and east European countries, entered in products such as fertilizers and basic chemicals. The relatively large number of producers would have strongly discouraged any ambitions to use patents to monopolize markets.
In Arora and Fosfuri (1998) we consider the case where at least one of the competing innovations is patented by an SEF. As noted earlier, SEFs usually lack the ability to undertake production on their own. In addition, attempts to go into the production of chemicals for themselves would put them in direct competition with their customers. An SEF, therefore, has little option but to license its technology to others. 22 Therefore, when one of the innovators is an SEF, the other innovator's dominant strategy would be to license its innovation as well.
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The evidence is consistent, although not conclusive. For instance, figure 3 shows that in all subsectors in which SEFs had more than 42% of market share during the 1980s, the average 21 The intuition is more easily understood in terms of the textbook example of Cournot oligopoly with constant (and symmetric) marginal costs and linear demand. In the context of this familiar model of oligopoly, the opportunity cost of licensing is related to the decrease in profits as a result of entry. This is less than the profits of the entrant, as long as the existing market structure is not a monopoly. However, all other producers experience a reduction in their profits. In Arora and Fosfuri (1998) we build up a model which also accounts for product differentiation. We show that the average number of licenses sold out by technology holders is a decreasing function of the degree of product differentiation (which is also borne out by table 6). The reason being that the more the product is differentiated the more the licensor internalizes the negative externality related to the decrease in profits. 22 Our data confirm that the average number of licenses sold out by SEFs is larger than the average number of licenses sold out by producers in basically all chemical sub-sectors. 23 Even when the rival is not an SEF, in many situations it would still require some type of co-operative arrangement between the owners of the competing technologies to dissuade them from licensing.
number of licenses sold out by chemical producers was 2.8, whereas in the sub-sectors in which SEFs had less than 18% of the market, it was as little as 1.3. 24 Using information about our 23 chemical sub-sectors we find that the correlation between the SEFs' market share and average number of licenses by chemical companies is equal to +0.42, with a t-statistics of +2.17. 25 Du Pont licensed out Nylon only to ICI and others with whom it had prior understanding and arrangement. It was only the pressure from anti-trust authorities that induced it to license to a domestic competitor, Chemstrand, in 1951 for $110 million, a very substantial sum. Du Pont also licensed a number of overseas producers. Similarly, ICI was forced to license polyethylene, on which it had a composition of matter patent (a product patent), in the US market by US anti-trust authorities. However, Stobaugh (1988) found that new products were rarely licensed unless it was to achieve some strategic objective. 26 For an existing producer that discovers a new process, the advantages to license would have to be balanced against the opportunity costs in the form of heightened competition. The latter could take two forms: lowering the marginal costs of the other existing producers, and new entry. The former can be offset to some extent by appropriately designing the licensing contracts. This line of reasoning also suggests why process licenses are SEFs, if they were to develop new products, would have to license them, as most biotech firms do for new pharmaceutical products. However, SEFs concentrate upon processes, rather than products. SEFs stay away from product innovation mainly because product innovation requires close links with downstream buyers, and often, the technical ability and financial resources to undertake costly market development. These requirements favor large firms with a diversified chemical portfolio. Hounshell and Smith (1988) 
WHY IN CHEMICALS?
The importance of licensing may be a distinguishing characteristics of the chemical sector. In most other industries, when licensing does take place is likely to be either crosslicensing, or overseas licensing. Anand and Khanna (1997) present evidence which suggests that the use of licensing as a strategy of rent appropriation is much less frequent outside of usually not exclusive. 27 As Reader (1970: 365) put it "Plastics and fibers shared similar technology, but in ICI they were seen as presenting vastly different commercial problems. With plastics, people in ICI felt fairly happy. They represented business of a kind they understood and which, they considered, fell fairly within their field: business, that is to say, in supplying other manufacturers with materials for their own activities. Fibers were different altogether. The field was dominated by Courtaulds --rich, successful, supposedly technically very expert, and a valued customer of ICI. Little was known in ICI about the technique of spinning and there were alleged to be arcane mysteries in the marketing of fibers to the textile industry. Moreover, the consumer market--the fashion trade, even--lay not far away, and that was no place for a self-respecting chemical firm." chemicals. We submit that the extensive licensing seen in the chemical sector is a consequence of three interrelated factors: the strength of patents, the existence of SEFs, and the characteristics of the technology and of the industry.
It is tempting to see the effectiveness of patents in chemicals solely as a creature of patent policy. However, one must also keep in mind the role of the underlying knowledge base, because ultimately, patents pertain to that part of the discovery that is codified. Therefore the effectiveness of patents also depends on how cheaply and effectively new ideas and knowledge can be articulated in terms of universal categories. identifies codified knowledge with what he calls the "generic" parts of technological knowledge. However, David (1993) argues that the extent of codification is a choice variable for economic agents.
As Arora and Gambardella (1994) to a chemist from an earlier generation. Chemical engineering (and the concomitant developments in polymer science and surface chemistry) thus provided the language for describing more precisely the innovations to be protected. 28 Simultaneously, these developments also allowed a better appreciation of the obvious extensions of the innovationthe scope of the innovation.
Patents work well in the chemical industry because the object of discovery can be described clearly in terms of formulae, reaction pathways, operating conditions and the like (e.g. Levin et al., 1987) . But it is not merely that the object of discovery is more discrete in the sense of being a particular compound. Rather, it is the ability to relate the "essential" structure of the compound to its function. This allows a patent to include within its ambit inessential variations in structure, as in minor modifications in side chains of a pesticide. 29 In fact, chemical patents frequently use Markush structures to define the scope of the claim. The use of Markush structures permits a succinct and compact description of the claims and allows the inventor to protect the invention for sets of related compounds without the expense (and tedium) of testing and listing the entire set. 30 The ability to explicate the underlying scientific basis of the innovation allows the scope of the patent to be delimited more clearly. The obvious extensions can be foreseen more easily and described more compactly.
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28 Von Hippel (1990) has very interesting parallels with the ideas presented above. To use Von Hippel's terminology, more general and abstract knowledge would make specific information less "sticky", while chemical engineering made possible a partitioning of the product and process developments. 29 In some instances, seemingly minor variations in side chains can have significant biological effects. Therefore, what is a "minor" variation is itself determined by the state of the current understanding of the relation between structure and function. 30 A Markush structure is best understood as a language for specifying chemical structures of compounds, which allows generic representation for an entire set of related compounds. See Maynard and Peters (1991: 71) for details. 31 The patent dispute involving the rival claims of Karl Ziegler and Giulio Natta in polypropylene are instructive. From McMillan's description, Ziegler appears as an inductive empiricist, never willing to speculate on the physical properties as a function of structure. Ziegler's inductive mind set is consistent with his polyethylene patent being written too narrowly. Hence, even though there is a near consensus that Ziegler had made the more fundamental discoveries, including the discovery of the catalyst system, Natta managed to obtain the fundamental patent on polypropylene. McMillan (1979: 124) suggests that Natta's superior patent position is attributable in large measure to Natta's "... elegant elucidation and proof of the structure and morphology of the When innovations can not be described in terms of universal and general categories, sensible patent law can only provide narrow patent protection. During the 1860s, when synthetic dyestuffs first appeared, their structure was poorly understood, and hence also were the reaction pathways and processes. Thus broad patents led to litigation and, in some cases, unwarranted monopolies. In France, an excessively broad patent on analine red was construed to include all processes for making the red aniline based dye, even though it was quite clear that the structure of aniline dyes was as yet unknown. There were long and bitter disputes in
England about the validity of the Medlock patent for magenta (another aniline dye) that turned on the appropriate definition of "dry" arsenic acid (with or without the water of hydration). In the case of aniline blue, the dispute rested on whether the substitution of an organic acid for an inorganic acid was enough to avoid infringement (see Travis, 1993: 104-137 
